Elderlake Partners

01 · Large exposures

Art 387–403 CRR

Purpose & history

The one limit that is not capital

Capital requirements price expected distributions of loss; they are nearly silent on the scenario where one counterparty takes a quarter of your Tier 1 with it. The large-exposures regime is that missing constraint: a hard limit — 25% of Tier 1 to any single client or group of connected clients, 15% between G-SIIs — that no risk weight, rating or profitability can relax. It is deliberately crude because concentration risk is deliberately simple: the failure of Herstatt, of Continental Illinois's oil-patch book, of every bank that discovered its ten largest names were secretly one name, is the same failure. The intellectual content of the regime sits almost entirely in one question: what is "one" counterparty? Control makes two entities one; so does economic dependence — the supplier who dies if the anchor client dies. The EBA's connected-clients guidelines are the case law of that question, and supervisors read group structures more sceptically than banks do.

Requirements

GCC identificationControl chains (ownership, dominant influence) plus economic-dependency analysis for large names; a governed register, re-examined on every material credit event.
Tier 1 baseLimits computed against Tier 1 only (CRR2 removed T2 from the base) — a quiet 15–20% tightening many boards never noticed.
CRM substitution trackingProtection shifts exposure to the protection seller for LE purposes — hedging a name consumes limit on the hedge counterparty.
Breach procedureLimits are hard: immediate notification, supervisory tolerance only time-bound and exceptional; trading-book excesses carry a dedicated capital charge instead.
ReportingAll exposures ≥ 10% of T1 ("large") reported; top exposures visible to the supervisor by name.

Calculations

The limits in euros T1 = €11bn → single client / GCC limit = €2.75bn · to another G-SII = €1.65bn · "large exposure" reporting threshold = €1.1bn.
Connected clients Exposure to HoldCo €1.2bn + OpCo €1.1bn + the OpCo's captive supplier (80% of its revenue) €0.7bn → one GCC of €3.0bn > €2.75bn — a breach no individual line predicted.
Substitution — hedging consumes limit elsewhere €3.0bn to client A, €1.0bn guaranteed by bank X: LE position becomes A €2.0bn + X €1.0bn (on top of everything else you already have with X). Concentration is conserved, not destroyed.
Exempt & special EU sovereigns 0%-weighted: exempt · covered bonds, intragroup, CCP trade exposures: partial/national treatments — the exemption map is where LE practice actually lives.

Changes & sources

  • Sources: Art 387–403 CRR; EBA GL on connected clients; LE reporting ITS.
  • CRR2 did the last tightening (T1 base, G-SII 15%); CRR3 leaves the regime stable. Watch shadow-bank exposure limits — the EBA's standing concern about NBFI concentrations arriving through the same door.

Independent analysis by Elderlake Partners, as at August 2026. Not legal, accounting or supervisory advice.