08 · IRRBB — EVE, NII & the SOT
Art 84, 98 CRD · EBA GL/RTS 2022–24
Purpose & history
Two lenses that disagree on purpose
ΔEVE revalues the whole banking book under rate shocks — the long-run solvency lens, punishing duration mismatch. ΔNII asks what happens to a year's earnings — the going-concern lens, punishing repricing gaps. They pull opposite ways: hedge the duration gap to protect EVE and you fix income streams that then miss rising rates in NII; run matched short books for NII and EVE barely moves but earnings whipsaw. Managing both is the actual craft of ALM, which is why Basel 2016 kept IRRBB in Pillar 2 with standardised outlier tests rather than a capital formula: the risk is real (2023's US failures were exactly unhedged EVE plus flighty deposits), but the numbers stand on behavioural assumptions — deposit cores, prepayment — no formula should pretend to own. The EBA's 2022 package added the NII SOT and standardised fallback methodologies for banks whose internal systems fail supervisory muster.
Requirements
Calculations
ΔEVE(+200bp) ≈ (7 − 2.5) × 40 × 2% = €3.6bn > 15%×T1 = €1.5bn → outlier
Add €25bn pay-fixed swaps (dur. 5): ΔEVE − 25×5×2% = 3.6 − 2.5 = €1.1bn → inside. That €25bn book is the "Dutch swap programme" the section note refers to.
Changes & sources
- Sources: Art 84/98 CRD; EBA GL on IRRBB & CSRBB (2022), RTS on the SOT scenarios and standardised methodology (2022–24).
- Watch: CSRBB quantification practice and whether NII SOT breaches start driving P2R the way EVE breaches long have.
Independent analysis by Elderlake Partners, as at August 2026. Not legal, accounting or supervisory advice.