03 · CCP exposures
Art 300–311 CRR
Purpose & history
Concentrating risk on purpose
Post-2008 policy pushed derivatives into central clearing deliberately: netting multilateralised, margining standardised, contagion channels cut. The capital regime is the incentive half of that bargain — trade exposures to a qualifying CCP weight at 2%, an order of magnitude below bilateral — and the honesty half: clearing members mutualise each other's failures through the default fund, so default-fund contributions carry a charge keyed to KCCP, the hypothetical capital of the CCP itself, allocated pro rata. The unresolved question is the one the design created: CCPs are now the most systemic nodes in finance, and their own recovery-and-resolution regime is younger and less tested than the banks' one it was meant to protect. The 2% is a policy price, not a risk price — and everyone involved knows it.
Requirements
Calculations
K ≈ 2.5% × 300m = €7.5m own funds (RWA-eq. ≈ €94m) — small next to the trade book, but it scales with everyone else's risk, not yours.
Changes & sources
- Sources: Art 300–311 CRR; EMIR (incl. EMIR 3 active-account requirements pushing euro clearing into the EU); CCP recovery & resolution regulation.
- Watch: EMIR 3 implementation reshuffling where cleared books sit, and the perennial KCCP methodology debates — the 2% itself is politically untouchable.
Independent analysis by Elderlake Partners, as at August 2026. Not legal, accounting or supervisory advice.